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INTRODUCTION
Over the centuries, advances in technology have continually
challenged the rights of copyright owners. The main battle today
is joined over the advances brought about by digital technology.
One example of this is movie editing software which allows the
user to play a DVD version of a movie in conjunction with the
software and skip or mute offensive material, such as violence,
nudity and profanity. The technology skips or mutes material
according to the timings of the original DVD and allows the user to
experience an altered version of the movie which is “unfixed”—
the altered version does not exist in any physical form. The altered
version is not contained on the original DVD because the DVD is
not affected by its use with the technology, nor does it exist in the
software, which merely contains timings specific to the movie.
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right
to all adaptations of their original works under the derivative
right.1 A section of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act,
entitled The Family Movie Act,2 amends the Copyright Act and
exempts from infringement the use of movie editing software.
However, an analysis of the policies and principles of copyright
suggests that without this statutory exemption, the altered versions
might infringe the derivative right of the copyrighted work.
Therefore, the Family Movie Act can be seen as encroaching upon
the derivative right. Unfixed works which are capable of infinite
repetition and which open new markets should be found to infringe
the copyright holder’s derivative right. In the future, we should be
cautious in granting protection for similar digital technologies.
Saving Private Ryan3 exposes the viewer to the reality of war
through the story of a group of soldiers who are ordered to find
1
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive right “to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”).
2
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202,
119 Stat. 218, 223–24 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter The Family Movie Act of 2005].
3
SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks Distribution, L.L.C. 1998).
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Private James Ryan and bring him home.4 When the United States
government learns that all three of Ryan’s brothers have been
killed in combat, it orders that the last remaining son be withdrawn
from combat.5
In contrast with many other war movies, Saving Private Ryan
gives a realistic depiction of war, by using close-up shots of the
violence and by remaining brutally honest about the nature of war.6
The movie opens with a truly horrific, graphic scene of destruction
and suffering: “thousands of terrified and seasick men, most of
them new to combat,” land on Omaha Beach and are “thrown into
the face of withering German fire.”7 The action is filmed in such a
manner that there is no sense of the progress the soldiers are
making as a group.8 Thus, the experience of the individual man on
the beach is recreated.9
Saving Private Ryan communicates complex and difficult
concepts using graphic images, violence, profanity, action, and
camaraderie.10 The humiliation and destruction engendered by the
system of war is total.11 The survival of any individual soldier
appears to depend on luck.12 Because the mission of the squad
sent to retrieve Ryan is tangential to the focus of the war, the
4

See Roger Ebert, A ‘Private’ Matter; Spielberg Conveys Action, Feelings of War:
Saving Private Ryan, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 24, 1998, Weekend Plus; Movies at 31
(reviewing SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks Distribution, L.L.C. 1998)), available at
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19980724/
REVIEWS/807240304/1023 (last visited July 17, 2005); Almar Haflidason, Saving
Private Ryan (1998), BBC FILM REVIEWS (updated Nov. 7, 2000) (reviewing SAVING
PRIVATE
RYAN
(Dreamworks
Distribution,
L.L.C.
1998))
at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/films/2000/11/07/saving_private_ryan_1998_review.shtml
(last
visited July 17, 2005).
5
Ebert, supra note 4; Haflidason, supra note 4.
6
Tom Feran, Commentary: Movie ‘Cleaners’ Rake in Dirty Money, NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2002. “SAVING PRIVATE RYAN . . . reenacted D-Day landings with a
startling, close-up candor that World War II veterans said was authentic.” Id.
7
Ebert, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Id.; see Haflidason, supra note 4. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN is “an important film that
deconstructs war machines into separate, frightened men as it so likely was.” Id.
10
Ebert, supra note 4.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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movie takes on a psychological rather than a military perspective.13
Thus, through this small story, the viewer is drawn into the effects
of war on the psyches of the individual men.14
If Saving Private Ryan’s extremely graphic portrayal of the
individual soldier’s experience of war were edited, it would likely
be easier on the eyes and the psyche of the viewer. It is also likely
that such edits would not change the overall plot or the
communication of the movie’s central message. However, Saving
Private Ryan was truly remarkable in that its portrayal of war for
the viewer is as terrifying as it was for the common soldier
experiencing it.15 An edited version would dilute the impact of the
movie upon the audience by substantially eliminating the candid
representation of the violence of war.
In fact, movies have started to be “sanitized” in just this
fashion. The editing is done in one of two ways: (1) companies
physically alter the video or DVD,16 or (2) software developed by
the companies, which is tailored to specific movies, reads the
original DVD and skips or mutes offensive material on-the-fly
without altering the original DVD.17 Where the altered version is
created by the use of editing software, no physical copy of the
altered version is made.

13

Haflidason, supra note 4.
Ebert, supra note 4.
15
Feran, supra note 6 (“SAVING PRIVATE RYAN . . . reenacted D-Day landings with a
startling, close-up candor that World War II veterans said was authentic.”); see Ebert,
supra note 4 (describing some of the graphic violence portrayed in the opening scene);
Haflidason, supra note 4 (SAVING PRIVATE RYAN’S “graphic violence” has been praised
for its “realism.”)
16
Christina Mitakis, The E-Rated Industry: Fair Use Sheep or Infringing Goat?, 6
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 291, 292–93 (2004); Sharon Weinberg Nokes, E-Rated Movies:
Coming Soon to a Home Theater Near You?, 92 GEO. L.J. 611, 616–17 (2004).
17
Michael P. Glasser, “To Clean or Not to Clean”: An Analysis of the Copyright and
Trademark Issues Surrounding the Legal Battle Between Third Party Film Editors and
the Film Industry, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 136–38 (2004); Ashley Kerns,
Modified to Fit Your Screen: DVD Playback Technology, Copyright Infringement or Fair
Use?, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 483, 489–92 (2004); Nokes, supra note 16, at 619–20;
Laura Jeanne Monique Silvey, Cutting Out the “Good” Parts: The Copyright
Controversy Over Creating Sanitized Versions of VHS/DVD Movies, 33 SW. U.L. REV.
419, 425–26 (2004).
14
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The edits made to Saving Private Ryan through these sanitizing
methods include hundreds of alterations to the original film.18
Four minutes of the twenty-five minute opening scene have been
deleted.19 The editing results in the elimination of “the most
stomach-churning injuries . . . including the astounding moment
when Tom Hanks realizes that the man he is dragging up the beach
is no longer a whole man.”20 The editing results in a loss of “the
very point of the movie that war is unimaginably cruel, random
and devastating.”21
Although the edits likely cut much of what makes Saving
Private Ryan remarkable, according to those in the editing
business, “the powerful portrayal of World War II combat
remains.”22
The altered version still leaves the viewer
“emotionally drained.”23 More importantly, the editing creates a
greater market for the movie. Those parents who had previously
chosen not to expose their children to graphic violence can now
show the movie without it.
The altered versions created by the digital movie-editing
technology are unfixed. Under the Copyright Act, a work is
“fixed” when it is embodied in a stable, physical object.24 The
definition of “fixation” excludes purely evanescent or transient
reproductions such as images projected briefly on a screen or
television, or copies captured momentarily in the “memory” of a

18

Louis Aguilar, Family-Friendly or Defaced? Colo. Stores’ Cleaned-up Movies Spur
1st Amendment Fight, DENV. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at A01.
19
Id.
20
Shawn Levy, CleanFlicks Throws the Baby Out With the Bathwater, NEWHOUSE
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 2, 2002; see Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos
With the Sex and Violence Excised, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11 (reporting that
“soldiers die but they do not bleed a lot”); Dan Kadison, H’wood: Don’t Cut – Lawsuit
Could Kill Companies Selling Cleaned-Up Films, N.Y. POST, Sept. 23, 2002, at 025
(noting that the “severed limbs of dying soldiers in [the] intense opening sequence” are
edited out).
21
Levy, supra note 20.
22
See Rich Vosepka, Turning R-rated Movies into G: Utah Video Clubs Edit Films for
Sex, Profanity, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 18, 2001, at E1.
23
Id. (quoting Braxton Schenk, an owner of a rental club which offers sanitized
movies).
24
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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computer.25 Here, the edited version of the movie created by the
use of software in conjunction with a copy of the original work is
unfixed because the altered form experienced by the viewer is not
embodied in a material object. The original DVD remains
untouched and the software is not able to recreate the edited
version on its own. The altered version can only be created by the
use of the software in conjunction with the unedited, original
DVD. Thus, the edited version exists only in the synthesis of the
software and the original DVD. The creation of a physicallyaltered tape or DVD for commercial profit is likely illegal.26
However, it is unclear whether an unfixed, altered version of a
copyrighted work is legal.
In exploring the general question of whether unfixed works can
violate the derivative right of copyright owners, the specific case
of digital movie-editing software will be used as an example.
Although the Family Movie Act exempts this software from
liability for copyright infringement,27 the software presents a
concrete basis on which to explore the question of whether
unfixed, altered works can infringe upon the derivative right of
copyright owners. This note concludes that fixation alone should
not pose a bar to a copyright owner’s claim for infringement of his
derivative right.
Part I of this note explains the concept and background of the
derivative right and an artist’s moral rights and sets forth the
history behind the drafting of the Family Movie Act. Part II
explores the principal language and legislative history of the
Copyright Act, the case law that addresses the question of whether
25

H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 53 (1976).
Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyrighted work is granted the exclusive
right to reproduce the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). This right is infringed upon
when the work is reproduced “in whole or in any substantial part, and by duplicating it
exactly or by imitation or simulation.” H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO.
94–473, at 58 (1975); see H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225 (“The Committee is aware of services and companies that create
fixed derivative copies of motion pictures and believes such practices are illegal under
the Copyright Act.”).
27
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
26
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the derivative right can be infringed by unfixed works, and the
incentive structure of the Copyright Act. Part III applies the
concepts developed in Part II to the specific case of the altered
versions of the movies created by the editing software. The note
concludes that in order to infringe the derivative right, fixation
should not be necessary. However, the note also proposes that two
determinations should be made prior to making an actual finding of
infringement: (1) whether the unfixed work can be recreated in an
identical fashion infinitely, and (2) whether it is reasonable to
expect that the copyright owner will enter the derivative market
which is being exploited by the allegedly infringing work on its
own.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MOVIE STUDIOS AND EDITING
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
A. Protection for Adaptations of Works Under the Derivative
Right of the Copyright Act
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”28 This clause is generally referred to as
the Intellectual Property Clause. Congress enacts copyright
statutes under this grant of power. The copyright statutes evolved
through amendments and revisions into the Copyright Act of
1976—the law in force today.29 The progression of the law has
generally been in the direction of expansion—that is, both the
scope of copyrightable subject matter and the rights granted to the
copyright holder have increased over time.
The statutory expansion of the scope of copyrightable subject
matter is attributable to the broadening of the interpretation of the
constitutional word “writings.”30 This term has been broadened (a)
28

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (2000).
30
1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 131 (1994) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976)); see also S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50–51 (1975).
29
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to encompass technological developments enabling new forms of
expression,31 such as the development of movies, and (b) to
include forms of expression that have been in existence for a long
time but not formerly considered creative and worthy of protection,
such as music, plays and art.32 Today, the Act of 1976 gives
copyright protection for:
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression . . . from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.33
The definition of the rights to which a copyright holder is
entitled has expanded with the scope of copyrightable subject
matter.34 Initially, the exclusive rights were limited to the right to
copy and the right to authorize reproduction and publication of the
work.35 However, as the scope of protectable subject matter
developed beyond books to include works such as plays, music and
art,36 the exclusive rights were correspondingly expanded to
include dramatization, public performance and public displays, as
well as translations and other adaptations.37 Today, the Copyright
Act of 1976 gives authors the exclusive right:
31

H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50 (1975). Some of
these forms could be considered subject matter Congress intended to protect from the
outset. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 50–51 (1975).
32
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51–52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 51 (1975).
33
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
34
1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 503.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 504.
37
Id.
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to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work;
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.38

Specifically, the importance of protection for the derivative
right has increased. For example, before dramatic plays were
considered copyrightable, an author of a book had no legal control
over the development of a play based on his copyrighted book.
Once plays were recognized as copyrightable, the protection
against the theft of an author’s novelistic expression became
important.
The derivative right was statutorily recognized by Congress for
the first time in the Copyright Act of 1870.39 That Act provided
that authors may “reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their
own works.”40 This provision reflected Congress’s response to
case law and to scholars who were struggling with the existing
scope of an author’s rights.41
38

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Patent and Copyright Act of 1870, 41 Cong. 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198.
40
2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 820 (quoting Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 41st Cong. 2d
Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212).
41
Id.
39
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The Copyright Act of 1909 broadened the scope of an author’s
derivative right by giving a copyright owner the exclusive right:
[t]o translate the copyrighted work into other languages or
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a
literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to
convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a
drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to
complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design
for a work of art . . . .42
By broadening the scope of the derivative right, Congress
intended to codify the “existing law as construed by the courts.”43
Finally in the 1976 Act, Congress granted the author the
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.”44 The 1976 Act defines derivative works as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted [or a] work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as
a whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .45
The derivative right overlaps with the reproduction right.
However, the derivative right is a broader right in that the
“reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas
the preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement
even though nothing is ever fixed in a tangible form.”46
Nevertheless, the derivative right is limited by the requirement that
42

Copyright Act of 1909, § 1(b), Pub. L. No. 60–349, 35 Stat. 1075, available at
http://www.kasunic.com/1909_act.htm (last visited July 21, 2005).
43
2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 821 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60–2222, at 4 (1909); S. REP.
NO. 60–1108, at 4 (1909)).
44
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
45
Id. § 101.
46
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); see also ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW:
HOWELL’S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 175 (5th ed. 1979).
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the work be based upon the copyrighted work.47 In addition, to
infringe the derivative right, the allegedly infringing work must
incorporate the copyrighted work in some form.48
The Copyright Act does not specify whether that form must be
physical.49 The legislative history suggests that the form need not
be physical.50 Therefore, the derivative right potentially protects
copyright owners against the unfixed, altered versions created by
the movie-editing software.
B

Protection Against Modifications of a Work
Under Moral Rights Law

Moral rights are distinct from the rights granted under
copyright law, which protect the copyright owner’s economic
interests.51 Moral rights are a bundle of rights which protect the
artist’s personal interest in preserving the artistic integrity of his
work and in compelling recognition for his authorship, regardless
of whether he owns the copyright in the work.52 Because moral
rights protect the honor and reputation of the artist, moral rights
may not be transferred from the artist to third parties.53
The concept of moral rights originated in continental Europe
and has been highly developed there.54 For example, in France,
these rights are referred to as le droit moral, which roughly
translates to rights which protect the spiritual, non-economic and
personal aspects of an artist’s work.55 By contrast, protection of
moral rights of artists under United States law is limited.
Legislators and courts have been slow to adopt provisions granting
47

17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000); LATMAN, supra note 46, at 175.
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
49
See infra Part II A.3.
50
See infra Part II A.3.
51
See Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before
Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 215–16 (1994).
52
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985).
53
See Kelly, supra note 51, at 215–16.
54
See 3 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (2005) [hereinafter
NIMMER TREATISE].
55
Id.
48
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protection for a work based on non-economic theories to persons
who may no longer own the copyright in the work.56
Several theories justify granting protection for moral rights.
First, the natural law theory implies that artistic works are
manifestations of the artist’s psyche. The work that the artist
creates, therefore, is his property and he has a right to control that
property.57 Second, an artistic work is seen as an extension of the
artist’s personality. Thus, protection for the work is triggered
under the individual’s right to the sanctity of his or her person
against outside interference.58 Third, by allowing an artist to
secure the aesthetic content of his work, the artist preserves his
honor and reputation, and thus secures the work’s economic value.
Injury to an artist’s reputation generally has a corresponding injury
to the economic value of his work.59 Finally, by granting
protection for moral rights, the interest society has in maintaining
its cultural identity is protected through preservation of its cultural
artifacts.60
In distinguishing between the protections afforded under
copyright law and moral rights law, Martin A. Roeder captured the
essence of moral rights in his article, The Doctrine of Moral Right:
A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators:61
The copyright law, of course, protects the economic
exploitation of the fruits of artistic creation; but the
economic, exploitative aspect of the problem is only one of
its many facets . . . . When an artist creates, be he an author,
a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a musician, he does
56

See id. § 8D.02[A].
See Craig A. Wagner, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive
Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 689 (1989). Copyright law is based on the
proprietary principle that the work is a product of intellectual labor “and [is] considered
as much the author’s own property as the physical substance on which it was written.” 1
PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW
2 (6th ed. 1986).
58
See Wagner, supra note 57, at 689–90.
59
Id. at 690; see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 566 (1940).
60
Wagner, supra note 57, at 690.
61
Roeder, supra note 59.
57
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more than bring into the world a unique object having only
exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of
his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.
There are possibilities of injury to the creator other than
merely economic ones; these the copyright statute does not
protect. Nor is the interest of society in the integrity of its
cultural heritage protected by the copyright statute.62
Moral rights generally include the right of disclosure, the right
of attribution, and the right of integrity.63 The right of disclosure
allows the artist to determine whether a work should be made
public.64 Under this right, “[t]he artist retains the right to modify,
destroy or hide the work . . .65 to refuse to complete a
commissioned work . . . 66 [and to] prohibit display of work that
[the artist] has already destroyed or discarded.”67
The right of attribution allows the artist to have his or her
authorship recognized in connection with a work, even if the actual
work has been transferred to another person.68 The artist may
require that his name, pseudonym or nom de plume be used with
his work.69 An artist can also prohibit the use of his name on
works he did not create.70 Thus, the artist can prevent others from
falsely attributing works to him.71 Finally, the attribution right
allows the artist to disclaim authorship if the work is altered to
such an extent that it is no longer considered to be the work of the
artist.72
62

Id. at 557.
3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.01[A]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 216;
Nokes, supra note 16, at 639.
64
Kelly, supra note 51, at 216–17; Kwall, supra note 52, at 6; see Roeder, supra note
59, at 559.
65
Kelly, supra note 51, at 216.
66
Id. at 216–17.
67
Kelly, supra note 51, at 217; see Roeder, supra note 59, at 559.
68
See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.03[A][1]; Kelly, supra note 51, at
217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 561–62.
69
Kelly, supra note 51, at 217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 562.
70
See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.03[B][1]; Kelly, supra note 51, at
217; Roeder, supra note 59, at 562, 563.
71
Roeder, supra note 59, at 562, 563; Wagner, supra note 57, at 692–93.
72
Kelly, supra note 51, at 217.
63
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The right of integrity enables the artist to preserve his work
even though the actual work may be in the possession of someone
else.73 This right lies at the heart of the moral right doctrine
because it prevents alterations that destroy the spirit and character
of an artist’s work.74 The right of integrity allows the artist to
prevent the work from being distorted, mutilated, modified or
truncated.75
However, this right does not protect against
destruction of the work.76 Once a work is destroyed completely, it
cannot reflect adversely upon the artist’s honor and reputation.77
Importantly, the right of integrity protects the public’s interest in
preserving the work as the artist intended it.78
Moral rights, particularly the right of integrity, if accepted in
the United States, could potentially protect the artist’s interest in
preventing the creation of an altered version of the original work,
such as the versions created by movie-editing software in that the
altered version likely desecrates the artist’s conception of his or her
work.
C. The Story Behind the Enactment of the Family Movie Act
The Family Movie Act was enacted to protect the interests of
consumers who find offensive the mature content contained in
some movies, including obscene language, sex and nudity,
violence and immoral behavior, such as drug use.79 The Act
exempts from copyright infringement technology which allows a
consumer to skip or mute offensive material.
In 1998, Sunrise Videos, a family-owned video store in Utah,
made physically-edited versions of movies available to
73

Wagner, supra note 57, at 692.
Kwall, supra note 52, at 8; Roeder, supra note 59, at 565 (“This aspect of the moral
right—often deemed to constitute the whole doctrine—is at once the oldest and best
known.”).
75
See 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.04[A]; Kelly, supra note 51, at 217–
18; see Kwall, supra note 52, at 10–11; Roeder, supra note 59, at 565–66, 569.
76
See Kelly, supra note 51, at 218–19; Roeder, supra note 59, at 569.
77
Kwall, supra note 52, at 9.
78
Kelly, supra note 51, at 219.
79
Benny Evangelista, House passes piracy measure; Film industry wins some, loses
other battles in Congress, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 20, 2005, at C1.
74
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consumers.80 Since then, several other businesses which sanitize
movies have opened and have spread rapidly.81 In addition,
software manufacturers have developed technology to allow
consumers to self-edit DVDs they rent or purchase. Originally, the
altered versions were targeted at religiously-sensitive consumers.82
Now, the targeted market has expanded to include parents who
desire to show their children sanitized versions of produced movies
which contain mature material.83 This industry has become known
as the “e-rated industry”—“e” stands for “edited.”84
Today, companies that provide sanitized films to individual
consumers use two different methods to edit the films. One
method involves editing techniques that create a physically-altered
copy.85 Generally, an edited master copy is made and then
repeatedly copied onto either the videocassettes containing the
original version of the movie or recordable DVDs.86 In an effort to
avoid inflicting the economic harm against which the copyright
laws protect, the companies using this method often purchase one
original copy of the movie for every edited copy they make.87
Thus, they maintain a one-to-one ratio of original-to-altered
versions of each movie.
A second group of companies, including ClearPlay and
Trilogy, have created software which edits movies as you watch
them.88 The software reads an original copy of the movie and
skips over material or mutes words according to the movie’s

80

Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–612.
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292.
“CleanFlicks experience fast growth to
approximately seventy outlets in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.” Id.
82
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291–92.
83
Glasser, supra note 17, at 134–35; see Kerns, supra note 17, at 513.
84
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291, n.2; Nokes, supra note 16, at 612.
85
See Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291, n.2; Nokes, supra note 16, at 616.
86
Nokes, supra note 16, at 618; Silvey, supra note 17, at 423–24.
87
Glasser, supra note 17, at 145–47, 173–74; see Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293.
88
Glasser, supra note 17, at 136–38.
81
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timings.89 By using this software, the original copy of the movie
remains unaltered, but the viewer experiences an altered version.90
The mature material is categorized into three or four groups
and each group has several settings. This allows the user to adjust
the settings and to select the amount of each type of material to be
edited. For example, ClearPlay has four categories of material
each with multiple settings: Violence; Language; Sex and Nudity;
and Other, which includes explicit drug use.91 Trilogy has three
categories each with four ratings: Language; Violence; and Adult
Themes.92 A user, therefore, can eliminate entirely the material
under one category, such as sex and nudity, but keep all of the
material under another category, such as profanity.
The Family Movie Act exempts from copyright infringement
private home viewings of movies which use software to skip
selected audio or video content.93 The Act reads:
[T]he making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a
member of a private household, of limited portions of audio
or video content of a motion picture . . . from . . . the
creation or provision of a computer program or other
technology . . . if no fixed copy of the altered version of the
motion picture is created by such computer program or
other technology.94
The exemption, therefore, applies only to the use of technology
which skips or mutes audio or visual content so that the viewer
does not experience that content95 and does not apply to physically

89

Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–92.
Glasser, supra note 17, at 138; Kerns, supra note 17, at 492; Nokes, supra note 16, at
619; Silvey, supra note 17, at 425–26.
91
Nokes, supra note 16, at 621; see Kerns, supra note 17, at 490–91 (describing the
criteria that ClearPlay’s employees to determine offensive content as “(1) blood and gore;
(2) violence, drug use, and other crude behavior; (3) profanity; and (4) sex and nudity”).
92
Nokes, supra note 16, at 621–22.
93
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
94
Id. at 223.
95
Id.
90

HAZEL

314

2/3/2006 10:59 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 16:297

altered copies.96 Thus, the editing companies which provide fixed
copies of the sanitized movie are excluded from the exemption
provided for by Congress in the Family Movie Act.97 Therefore,
the editing companies pose an easy target for infringement actions
by movie studios based on violation of the reproduction and
derivative rights because they are making a fixed copy of the
altered work and are, therefore, not exempted from liability by
Congress.98
Although the Family Movie Act exempts the digital movieediting technology from infringement, it does not address the
legality of unfixed, altered works in a general matter.99 Therefore,
outside of the provisions of the Family Movie Act, the legality of
unfixed, altered works is uncertain.
II. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT STATUTORY,
JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY MATERIALS
A. Moral, Reproduction and Derivative Rights Provisions Under
the Copyright Act
It is clear that physically-altered fixed movies are not exempted
from infringement by the Family Movie Act. However, outside of
the exemptions provided for in the Family Movie Act, in the digital
age, the more interesting analysis involves whether the right to
prepare derivative works can be infringed by works which are not
fixed.

96

Id.
Id.
98
See H. R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225.
In fact, the movie studios have brought claims against the editing companies for this very
reason. See, e.g., Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civ. Action No. 02–M–1662 (MJW) (D. Co.);
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294.
99
The Family Movie Act specifically addresses the legality of movie-editing software,
but does not cover other examples of unfixed altered works which may arise in the future.
97
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1. Protection Against Modifications to Artistic Works Under
Moral Rights
The Berne Convention,100 an international convention signed
by seventy-seven countries, governs the copyright laws of its
signatories.101 Berne provides for protection of moral rights under
Article 6bis, 102 which protects the right of integrity and the right of
attribution. The language regarding the right of integrity reads:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right . . . to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.103
In adhering to the Berne Convention, Congress declared that
the existing provisions under the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act
and existing state laws were sufficient to satisfy the requirements
under Article 6bis.104 The Copyright Act itself grants only limited
protection for the right of integrity.105 The Act provides protection
for this right under a section called the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 (hereinafter VARA)106 but extends this protection only to
creators of works of visual art.107 Works of visual art include
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs.108 Audiovisual works and works for hire—including movies—are

100

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99–27, 1971 WL 123138 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The United
States adopted the Convention under the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
101
4 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 17.01[B][1].
102
Berne Convention, supra note 100, art. 6bis.
103
Id. art. 6bis(1).
104
2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 1275.
105
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2000).
106
Id.; see 3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.06.
107
17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2000).
108
Id. § 101.
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specifically excluded from the provision for moral rights
protection.109
According to Melville B. and David Nimmers’ widely
respected treatise on copyright law, the Congressional finding that
United States laws are adequate to satisfy the obligations under the
Berne Convention “flies in the face of a number of judicial and
scholarly pronouncements on the subject.”110 Moreover, the
judicial interpretation of the laws which might serve to protect the
moral rights of works which fall outside of the provisions of
VARA, has been narrow and unforgiving.111
109

Id.
3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.02[D][1]. The treatise points to John
Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1035–36
(1976) (“The moral right of the artist, and in particular that component called the right of
integrity of the work of art, simply does not exist in our law.”), and Weinstein v. Univ. of
Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[D]roit moral, the Continental principle”
is a doctrine that “no American jurisdiction follows as a general matter.”).
111
The recent Supreme Court pronouncement in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003), on the right of attribution limits the
doctrine of moral rights in general. The Court considered a claim by Fox under the
Lanham Act for false designation of origin based on a set of videos that Dastar had
reworked and sold as their own. The original video set, which had fallen into the public
domain, was made from a television series, which was based on a book. Fox had
repurchased the television rights to the book. The Court concluded that unless Dastar had
purchased the original set of videos and repackaged them as their own, Fox could not
claim any right of attribution. The Court found that Congress had limited the right of
attribution under copyright law to works of visual art. The Court concluded that if the
Court were to recognize “a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) . . .these limitations [would be rendered]
superfluous. A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of
course to be avoided.” 539 U.S. at 35. Thus, the Court’s conclusion generally limits the
doctrine of moral rights. Although the Second Circuit had earlier recognized a cause of
action for the right of integrity brought under the Lanham Act, Gilliam v. American
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that “ABC impaired the integrity of
appellants’ work and represented to the public as the product of appellants what was
actually a mere caricature of their talents”), Dastar may have weakened the effect of the
Second Circuit’s ruling because the Second Circuit used the Lanham Act to provide
protection for moral rights, rights typically associated with copyright laws. Recent cases
have refused to recognize a cause of action under the Lanham Act which would protect
the artist’s right of integrity. See Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of
New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 (DAB), 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003)
(finding with respect to a right of integrity claim based on the destruction of a work of
visual art that “Congress intended VARA to pre-empt not only state statutes and common
law which seek to protect visual artists’ moral rights, but all of the federal remedies as
110
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Without protection for moral rights for works other than works
of visual arts, artists must rely on unfair competition law,
trademark law, defamation, invasion of privacy, contract law and
the derivative right under copyright law to protect their interest in
their creations.112 However, these causes of action are imperfect in
protecting moral rights because they require elements of proof
which are not directly applicable to a moral rights claim.113 For
example, unfair competition law protects economic rights and
protects against consumer deception and thus, requires an artist to
bring evidence that a competitor passed off the artist’s work as the
competitor’s, and evidence of the likelihood of confusion. Neither
of these elements are applicable to the protection afforded under
the doctrine of moral rights. Any overlap between these two areas
of law which might provide protection for the moral rights of an
artist “merely is fortuitous.”114
The Nimmer treatise asserts that “[o]ne cannot make an end
run around the limitations of . . . [VARA] by reading the Copyright
Act’s . . . [derivative] right broadly, so as to encompass any
modification of a copyrightable work, even though it may fail to
qualify as a work of visual art.”115 In making this assertion, the
well.”); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119,
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming the findings regarding the Lanham Act claim). The lower court in Boosey &
Hawkes found with respect to a right of integrity claim based on the modification of a
musical work brought under the Lanham Act that neither the Lanham Act § 43(a) nor
Gilliam “precludes persons from modifying or mutilating a work.” Id. Moreover, the
lower court found that the Lanham Act only “proscribes a person from falsely
representing that a modification of an original work is either (1) the original work or (2) a
work of the author of the original.” Id.
112
Kwall, supra note 52, at 3, 18.
113
Id. at 23.
114
Id. at 24.
115
3 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8D.06[C][1]. In making this assertion, the
treatise cites Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit
considered whether A.R.T. Co. infringed Lee’s derivative right when A.R.T. Co.
purchased some of Lee’s notecards and lithographs, mounted the works on ceramic tiles
and resold the tiles. The Seventh Circuit found that there was no infringement because
A.R.T. Co.’s actions merely constituted “changing the way in which a work of art [is]
displayed.” Lee, 125 F.3d at 581. However, the Ninth Circuit in Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), and the District of Alaska in
Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), considered
identical cases and came to a conclusion opposite to the Seventh Circuit’s. The District
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treatise relies on the law reflecting only one side of a circuit
split.116 Thus, it is unclear whether this assertion is correct. In
fact, contrary to this assertion, the derivative right, and also the
reproduction right, may protect against such modifications,
depending on the quantity and quality of the modifications and
how the altered work is used.
2. Protection Against Reproduction of Works
in Substantial Part
The reproduction right does not provide any protection against
unfixed, altered versions of copyrighted works. The reproduction
right provides that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive
right[] to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords.”117
The Act defines “copies” as “material
objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.”118
The legislative history of the Copyright Act likewise limits the
reproduction right to “the right to produce a material object in
which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in
a fixed form from which it can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.’”119 To infringe the reproduction right requires
“reproducing [the work] in whole or in any substantial part, and by
duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation.”120 Thus, the
of Alaska followed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which found that A.R.T. Co. had “recast,
transformed or adapted” the original work, creating an unauthorized derivative work in
violation of the original owner’s copyright. Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1343–44. The
Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected A.R.T. Co.’s argument that mounting the artwork onto
the tiles constituted a mere change in the way the work was displayed. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit,
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. v. Mirage Editions, Inc., 489 U.S. 1018 (1989) (No. 88–1086).
116
See supra note 115 (explaining the circuit split).
117
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
118
Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
119
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58
(1975) (emphasis added).
120
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
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exercise of and infringement of the reproduction right are limited
to works which are fixed in a tangible medium.121
3. Protection Against Altered Versions of Works
Under the Derivative Right
a) The Statutory Language of the Copyright Act
In contrast with the reproduction right, the derivative right may
provide protection for unfixed, altered versions of copyrighted
works. The Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright the
exclusive right to “prepare” derivative works.122 It is clear that in
order for a derivative work to be copyrightable, it must be fixed.123
However, it is not clear whether a work must be fixed to infringe
the derivative right of a copyright owner.124
Courts and
commentators have analyzed the Copyright Act and the legislative
reports to ascertain Congress’s intent on the question. They have
come to conflicting conclusions. The ambiguity lies in the
definition of “derivative work” as compared with definitions of
other “works” under the Copyright Act and the use of the term
“prepare” in the grant of the derivative right.
121

1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 689. “The elements of a prima facie case of infringement
of the reproduction right are . . . (3) unauthorized copying by the defendant.” Id. This
triggers the § 101 definition of “copies” which is limited to “material objects.” See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
122
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
123
Id. § 102. “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated.” Id. § 102(a). “In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Id. § 102(b).
124
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976). “[T]he [unauthorized] preparation of a
derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.” Id.
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the exclusive right
of reproduction to some extent. It is broader than that right, however, in the
sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the
preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement even though
nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.
Id. at 58.
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The Copyright Act does not define “work.” Instead, it defines
specific types of works, such as derivative works, literary works,
and pictoral, graphic and sculptural works.125 In its definition of
“derivative works” the Act does not reference fixation in any
way.126 This contrasts with the definitions of other types of works
which do reference fixation, including architectural works,
audiovisual works, literary works, and pictoral, graphic and
sculptural works.127 So, in the context of a derivative work,
nothing in the word “work” seems to require it to be fixed. For a
derivative work to be copyrightable, it must be fixed.128 However,
the ambiguity of the language of the statute leaves open the
possibility that a copyrighted work may be able to be infringed by
an unfixed work.
The Copyright Act provides for the exclusive right to “prepare”
rather than “create” derivative works.129 According to the
definition of “create,” it is clear that to “create” a work, the work
must be fixed.130 The Act gives a definition of the time at which a
work is “created”—“when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for
the first time.”131 A work is “fixed” when “its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.”132 The definition of
fixation excludes “purely evanescent or transient reproductions
such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on

125

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Id.
127
Id. The Act defines an ‘architectural work’ as “the design of a building as embodied
in any tangible medium of expression.” Id. The Act defines ‘audiovisual works’ as
“works that consist of a series of related images . . . regardless of the nature of the
material objects . . . in which the works are embodied.” Id. The Act defines ‘literary
works’ as “works . . . expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols
or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are
embodied.” Id. The Act limits the definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’
to those which are “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works.” Id.
128
Id. § 102.
129
Id. §106(2).
130
Id. § 101.
131
Id. (emphasis added).
132
Id.
126
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a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in
the ‘memory’ of a computer.”133
In defining the derivative rights of the author, the Act does not
use the word “create.” Instead, it uses the word “prepare.”
“Prepare” is not defined and, therefore, contains no reference to
fixation. Thus, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works is
less exact than the exclusive right to reproduce or distribute, both
of which are limited to reproducing or distributing material
objects.134 Therefore, although a derivative work must be fixed to
be copyrighted,135 the use of the word “prepare” leaves room for
infringement of the derivative right by unfixed works.
b) The Legislative History of the Copyright Act
Even if the interpretation of the word “prepare” in the
derivative rights section of the Copyright Act was dismissed as
distinguishing between the type of labor the author performs rather
than distinguishing among fixed or unfixed works, or as saying
nothing about the requirements for infringement of the derivative
right at all, the legislative history of the derivative right indicates in
plain language that to infringe the derivative right, the infringing
work need not be fixed.136 The legislative history provides that for
a work to be an infringement of the derivative right, the work
“must be ‘based upon the copyrighted work,’” and thus “must
incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.”137
However, the reports make it clear that the form in which the
copyrighted work is incorporated need not be a material object.
The legislative reports explain that the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works overlaps with the exclusive right of reproduction,
but is broader than the reproduction right in that “reproduction
requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the

133
134
135
136
137

H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 53 (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000).
Id. § 102.
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
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preparation of a derivative work . . . may be an infringement even
though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.”138
According to the Nimmer treatise, when the derivative right is
infringed upon, either the reproduction right or the performance
right is also necessarily infringed.139 This suggests that fixation is
not required to infringe. The performance right includes the
exclusive right to “recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work],
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images
in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.”140 The performance right, as compared to the display
right, does not involve a “copy” of the work, and thus does not
require fixation.141 In its discussion of protection of a performance
through fixation of the performance in a recording, the House
Report implies that a performance is unfixed.142 If the Nimmer
treatise is correct that infringement of the derivative right
necessarily involves either infringement of the reproduction right
or infringement of the performance right,143 then the derivative
right can be infringed by works which are unfixed.
The Nimmer treatise goes on to argue, however, that because
the same term “derivative right” is used both in the explanation of
138

H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A].
140
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
141
Id. The display right gives the owner of the copyright the exclusive right “to show a
copy of [the work].” Id.
142
See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 52 (1976) (“[A]n unfixed work of authorship, such as
an improvisation or an unrecorded choreographic work, performance or broadcast, would
continue to be subject to protection under State common law or statute, but would not be
eligible for Federal statutory protection under 102.”). The recent, related controversy
over the anti-bootlegging statutes also indicates that the performance itself is not fixed.
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), (holding that the
antibootlegging statutes are unconstitutional), appeal docketed, No. 04–5649 (2d Cir.
Oct. 26, 2004); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D.
Cal. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04–57077, (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) (holding that the
antibootlegging statutes are unconstitutional); contra United States v. Moghadam, 175
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir.
1999), (finding the antibootlegging statutes constitutional), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036
(2000).
143
2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A].
139
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the protection afforded to derivative works144 and the scope of
infringement,145 Congress did not intend two different meanings to
apply to the copyrightability of derivative works and the
infringement of derivative works. The Nimmer treatise asserts that
the actual language of the Act is unambiguous and, therefore,
fixation is required both for copyrightability and for
infringement.146 Because the language of the Act is unambiguous,
the treatise argues, the legislative history should be ignored.147
Finally, the treatise dismisses as dictum the Ninth Circuit’s
findings that there exist two different standards for derivative
works.148 The Ninth Circuit has held that for a derivative work to
be copyrightable it must be fixed, but for a work to infringe upon
the derivative right it need not be fixed.149
The assertions of the Nimmer treatise seem overly simplistic.
Contrary to those assertions, the enactment of the Family Movie
Act indicates that Congress still believes that the derivative right—
in the specific subject matter of home-movies covered by the
Act—may be infringed by unfixed works.150
B. Relevant Case Law
Notwithstanding the statute-based arguments on either side, a
few circuit courts have analyzed whether fixation is required for
infringement of the derivative right. In Lone Ranger Television,
Inc. v. Program Radio Corporation,151 the Ninth Circuit suggested
that there are two different standards for the copyrightability of
derivative works and the infringement of the derivative right. The
same circuit followed that finding by clearly stating that fixation is
144

See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)–(b) (2000). This section provides protection only for
material that that author contributed to the preexisting work and does not extend to
preexisting material employed in the work.
145
See id. § 106(2).
146
2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A].
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
150
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
151
740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984).

HAZEL

324

2/3/2006 10:59 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 16:297

not required for infringement of the derivative right in Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.152 The Ninth and
Seventh Circuits both analyzed whether works which were not
clearly fixed infringed the derivative right of the original work in
Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.153 and Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Artic International, Inc., respectively.154 In these cases, as well as
in Galoob, the circuits emphasized the importance of the
consideration of whether the allegedly infringing work exploits a
distinct market and whether the copyright owner has the right to
monopolize that market.
Moreover, before the issue of the legality of unfixed, altered
works arose in the context of home-viewed movies, the very same
issue arose in the context of video games. The video game
technological innovations work in a strikingly similar manner as
the movie-editing technology. The allegedly infringing altered
video games were created by technology used in conjunction with
the original video game. Thus, the altered versions of the games
were created through a synthesis of the original game and the
instructions contained in the technology. In Galoob, the user
inserted a card in between an original game cartridge and the video
game system.155 This allowed the user to change up to three
features of the game, such as the number of lives of the character,
or the speed at which the character moved.156 In Midway, the
defendant substituted a circuit board in the original game which
increased the speed of the game, making it a much more exciting
game.157
In Lone Ranger,158 the defendant bought reel-to-reel copies of
Lone Ranger episode production tapes from some collectors and
re-mixed the recordings onto broadcast cartridges for radio
broadcasts.159 The Ninth Circuit found that the contribution of the
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967.
Id.
Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010.
Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 720.
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independent expression by the actors, together with the
contribution of the independent expression by the special
production methods of taping and editing for radio, created a new
work for a different market.160 Importantly, the court found that
“[i]t makes no difference that the derivation may not satisfy certain
requirements for statutory copyright registration itself.”161 In this
case, infringement of the derivative right was by a fixed product.
However, the Lone Ranger decision suggests the existence of
different standards for copyrightability (fixed) as opposed to the
infringement (unfixed) of derivative works. This lends support to
the notion that the derivative right of a copyrighted work may be
infringed by works which are not copyrightable because they are
not fixed.162 If infringing works were held to a different standard
and the statements in the legislative reports indicating that a work
does not have to be fixed to infringe the derivative right were taken
at face value, then the unfixed, altered works created by the editing
technology may infringe the derivative right.
In Galoob, the Ninth Circuit addressed head-on the question of
whether fixation is required for infringement of the derivative
right.163 Nintendo sold video games and video game systems.164
The games were contained on cartridges which were inserted into
the Nintendo game systems.165 Galoob produced the Game Genie,
which was used in conjunction with Nintendo games.166 The
Game Genie altered up to three features of the game by blocking
the value for a single data byte sent by the game cartridge to the
system and replacing it with a new value.167 For example, a player
could (1) increase the number of lives of his character, (2) increase
the speed at which his character moved, and (3) choose to give his
character the ability to float above obstacles.168 The Game Genie

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 967.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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did not alter the data that was stored in the cartridge.169 Instead,
the Game Genie was inserted between a cartridge and the
system.170 The Ninth Circuit followed Lone Ranger in its
conclusion that a derivative work must be fixed to be protected
under the Act, but does not have to be fixed to infringe a
copyrighted work.171 Thus, an unfixed, altered version of a
copyrighted work could potentially infringe the derivative right of
the original work.
However, after making this finding, the Ninth Circuit then
reinserted the requirement of fixation to infringe the derivative
right by requiring that the audiovisual displays enhanced by the
Game Genie incorporate the original work in “some concrete or
permanent form.”172 Galoob looked to the list of examples of
derivative works provided in the Act for support for the
requirement that the derivative work physically incorporate the
underlying work.173 The Galoob court concluded that because the
altered displays were not embodied in a concrete or permanent
form, the Game Genie did not create a derivative work—the
modified game took place only once as it was being played—and
therefore did not infringe upon Nintendo’s exclusive right to
prepare derivative works.174 The court then analyzed the Game
Genie under the fair-use doctrine and found that because the Game
Genie did not detract from Nintendo’s market175 and because it
was used privately,176 it fell within the fair-use defense.177 This
case has resulted in much confusion because its requirement that a
work be fixed to infringe the derivative right contradicts its
pronouncement that infringement of the derivative right does not
require fixation.

169

Id.
Id.
171
Id. at 968 (emphasis in original); see Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio
Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1984).
172
Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968 (emphasis in original omitted).
173
Id. at 967.
174
Id. at 969.
175
Id. at 971.
176
Id. at 970.
177
Id. at 972.
170
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The Ninth Circuit returned to the question of whether fixation
was necessary for infringement of the derivative right in
FormGen.178 FormGen produced a computer game, Duke Nukem
3D.179 The game consisted of three separate components: the
game engine, the source art library, and the MAP files.180 The
MAP files contained instructions which directed the game engine
to place particular images in specific places.181 The engine
accessed the source art library, selected the images and positioned
them appropriately on the display.182 The MAP files described the
levels of the game in great detail, but did not contain the
copyrighted art.183 The art was in the source art library.184 With
FormGen’s encouragement, players created new levels for the
game and posted them on the internet for others to download.185
Micro Star then downloaded 300 user-created levels, burned them
onto a CD, and sold the CDs commercially as Nuke It.186
The Nuke It CD contained MAP files.187 When using the CD,
the MAP files instructed the game engine to access its own source
art library for the images necessary for the displays.188 The Ninth
Circuit followed its earlier pronouncement in Galoob that to
infringe upon the derivative right of the original work, the
derivative work must incorporate the original work in a concrete or
permanent form.189 To distinguish Micro Star’s MAP files from
The Game Genie in Galoob, the FormGen court described The
Game Genie as a passive interface: “it functioned only as a
window into a computer program, allowing players to temporarily
modify individual aspects of the game.”190 When the game was
178

154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1109.
180
Id. at 1110. MAP files are “[s]o-called because the files all end with the extension
‘.MAP.’” Id. at 1110 n.2.
181
Id. at 1110.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1109.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1112.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 1110.
190
Id. at 1111.
179
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over, the unfixed derivative work was gone and could only be
reconstructed if the player decided to reenter the same codes.191
In contrast with the findings regarding The Game Genie, the
FormGen court found that the audiovisual displays generated by
Duke Nukem 3D were in the MAP files of Micro Star’s Nuke It
CD.192 The FormGen court compared the audiovisual displays
described by the Nuke It CD to the notations describing
pantomimes and dances, which could be “described in sufficient
detail to enable the work to be performed from that description.”193
Although the Nuke It CD did not contain the source art itself, it
infringed FormGen’s right to create sequels to its game.194 The
stories of the sequels were contained in Nuke It’s MAP files which
“[told] new . . . tales of Duke’s fabulous adventures.”195 In
dismissing Micro Star’s fair-use defense, the court noted that
Micro Star’s sales of Nuke It “‘impinged on [FormGen’s] ability to
market new versions of the [Duke Nukem 3D] story.’ Only
FormGen has the right to enter that market; whether it chooses to
do so is entirely its business.”196 This decision strengthens a
copyright owner’s derivative right by emphasizing the importance
of protection of the right to exploit markets distinct from the
market originally entered.
In Midway,197 a 1982 decision, the Seventh Circuit established
that altered forms of copyrighted works which serve a new market
constitute derivative works. Midway manufactured video game
machines, which used circuit boards to create the images that
appeared on the screen.198 Artic sold two circuit boards for use
inside Midway’s video game machines.199 One board speeded-up

191

Id.
Id.
193
Id. at 1112 (quoting 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW
(1994)).
194
Id. at 1113.
195
Id. at 1112.
196
Id. at 1113.
197
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982).
198
Id. at 1010.
199
Id.
192
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the rate of play for Midway’s game “Galaxian.”200 The other
board stored a set of images and sounds almost identical to that
stored in Midway’s game “Pac-Man.”201 The Seventh Circuit
found that the “speeded-up” version of the games were derivative
works.202 The speeded-up game was more challenging and more
exciting.203 Because the speeded-up games ended sooner, they
also had the potential for greater revenues if players were willing
to pay the additional price-per-minute.204 The court concluded that
the owner of the copyright should be entitled to monopolize the
speeded-up version of the game on the same theory that he was
entitled to monopolize the derivative works listed in § 101.205 This
conclusion was echoed by the Ninth Circuit in FormGen.206
Midway, like FormGen, carves the markets narrowly and allows a
finding that the allegedly infringing use exploits a distinct market.
Such a finding strengthens the copyright owner’s derivative right.
C. Defenses to the Claim of Infringement of the Derivative Right
Defendants to allegations of copyright infringement have two
affirmative defenses available to them, the idea-expression
dichotomy207 and the fair-use defense.208 These defenses prevent
facts and ideas from being monopolized by copyright owners and
protect the criticism and the ordinary use of copyrighted works.
These defenses also serve to protect First Amendment interests,
which, on some level, inherently conflict with the purposes of
copyright law. By protecting ideas and facts from being
copyrighted, they are free for use by subsequent authors in their
own self-expression, democratic dialogue or protest.209 By
200

Id.
Id. at 1010–11.
202
Id. at 1013–14.
203
Id. at 1013.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1014.
206
Micro Star v. FormGen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998).
207
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
208
See id. § 107.
209
The First Amendment is justified on three bases: (1) free speech is a necessary
concomitant of a self-governing, or democratic, society because “freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
201
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protecting the ordinary use of copyrighted works and the comment
upon or criticism of those works, learning and creation can
progress.210 Thus, these defenses protect the First Amendment
interests of freedom of speech and the furtherance of knowledge.211
truth,” (2) free speech is important as an end in itself “because the very nature of man is
such that he can realize self-fulfillment only if he is free to express himself,” (3) free
speech is necessary because “men are less inclined to resort to violence to achieve given
ends if they are free to pursue such ends through meaningful, non-violent forms of
expression.” Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1187–88 (1970)
[hereinafter Nimmer Article]. By protecting ideas and facts from being copyrighted, the
most important objective of the freedom of speech, “the maintenance of democratic
dialogue,” is protected because “[i]t is exposure to ideas, and not to their particular
expression, that is vital if self-governing people are to make informed decisions.” Id. at
1191. The limitations imposed on free speech by copyright law do not effect the second
two bases for free speech: self-fulfillment likely does not require copying of other
people’s expression; violence is not likely to be inflamed because one person is not
allowed to copy the expression of another. Id. at 1192. Because it is the dissemination of
ideas that is important to reducing violence and to self-fulfillment, the idea-expression
dichotomy is justified by “the public interest that ideas be liberated from all monopoly
constraint.” Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
1056 (1970) [hereinafter Goldstein First Amendment Article]. The idea-expression
dichotomy strikes “a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985) (quoting the lower court, 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
210
“[A] prohibition of [reasonable use of an author’s copyrighted works] would inhibit
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . . frustrate
the very ends sought to be attained,” the promotion of the progress of science and the
useful arts. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
211
Some scholars believe that copyright law should revert to its unfair competition law
roots. See Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38–
39 (1987); 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 32. These scholars believe that the expansion of
copyrightable subject matter, the expansion of the scope of rights and the extension of the
duration of protection of the copyright create a regime that is incompatible with free
speech, Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and
Breaking-up, 43 IDEA 233, 290 (2003), because the expansion of these rights bring
ordinary uses of copyrighted works within the realm of infringement and thus constrains
learning through the dissemination of information. See Patterson, supra, at 37–39, 44.
Moreover, these scholars believe that the expansion of copyright law goes hand-in-hand
with the current, proprietary notion of copyright law which improperly diverges from the
Act’s regulatory nature. Patterson, supra, at 62. However, the copyright law of the
United States, rooted in English copyright law, 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; PATRY,
supra note 57, at 2, is based on the proprietary principle that the work is a product of
intellectual labor “and [is] considered as much the author’s own property as the physical
substance on which it was written.” 1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 3; PATRY, supra note 57,
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1. Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea-expression dichotomy excludes from copyright
protection “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”212 This ensures that the constitutional goal of “promoting
the progress of science”213 is achieved by both protecting the
author’s expression, which encourages the investment in creation
of works, and by allowing the ideas and facts upon which the work
is based to remain free for subsequent authors to use.214 This
defense does not allow authors to copy another’s expression of an
idea but does allow an author to use the ideas of and the facts used
by another author.
2. Fair Use Doctrine
The fair-use doctrine gives “a privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without [the owner’s] consent.”215 Ordinary
use of a copyrighted work for many consumers involves (1) the use
of the work for commentary, educational, political and industrial
uses, or (2) the use of the ideas and facts of a work by subsequent
authors.216 This allows both learning and creation to progress.
The Supreme Court stated that:
at 2. To characterize the Copyright Act as a regulatory machine whose purpose is merely
dissemination of works, seems to recognize only the superficial result of the Act’s
existence. If copyright law is limited to protecting distribution and is relegated to simply
being a regime of pure misappropriation law, much of the scope of rights granted to the
author would have to be stricken. Only the reproduction right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and
the distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), are within the concept of a misappropriation
regime of copyright law. However, the rights which protect works beyond pure
misappropriation have not been carved out surreptitiously. They are the product of much
reflection by the courts upon the incentive structure behind copyright law, the purpose of
copyright law and the First Amendment. 2 PATRY, supra note 30, at 820–21.
212
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
213
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
214
1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 319.
215
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting
H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
216
1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 718–26.
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[the] author’s consent to a reasonable use of his
copyrighted works . . . [is] implied by the courts as a
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting
the progress of science and the useful arts, since a
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers
from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . .
frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.217
Thus, the standard of fair use is whether a reasonable copyright
owner would have consented to the use.218 The doctrine, therefore,
allows “copying by others which does not materially impair the
marketability of the work which is copied.”219 Professor Nimmer
summed up the nature of First Amendment rights protected by the
fair-use doctrine as they relate to copyrighted expression:
[W]hile public enlightenment may require the copying of
ideas from others, it remains perfectly possible for the
speaker (or writer) who copies ideas from another, to
supply his own expression of such ideas. . . . There can be
no first amendment justification for the copying of
expression along with idea simply because the copier lacks
either the will or the time or energy to create his own
independently evolved expression. The first amendment
guarantees the right to speak; it does not offer . . . a subsidy
at the expense of authors whose well-being is also a matter
of public interest.220
The fair-use doctrine was developed in the common law.221
The three factors which encapsulate the common law conception
of the fair-use defense were outlined as early as 1841 in Folsom v.
Marsh.222 Folsom stated that in considering the fair-use defense, a
217

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). “Sanction of the fair use defense . . . recognizes the
alleged infringer’s standing to assert [the] public interest [in access to didactic
expression].” Goldstein First Amendment Article, supra note 209, at 1056.
218
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550.
219
Nimmer Article, supra note 209, at 1200–01.
220
Id. at 1203.
221
1 PATRY, supra note 30, at 718.
222
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
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court must consider “the nature and objects of the selections made,
the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.”223 Today, this
doctrine is comprised of four factors and is codified in the
Copyright Act. The Act reads:
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.224
The fair-use doctrine is meant to permit and require courts “to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster.”225 All four factors must “be explored and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”226 Thus,
the defense must be considered on a case-by-case basis.227 The
fair-use doctrine allows consumers to use copyrighted works in an
223

Id. at 348.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
225
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
226
Id. at 578.
227
Id. at 577.
224
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ordinary fashion without encroaching upon the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights.
D. The Incentive Structure of the Copyright Act
The Copyright Act is intended to give authors an incentive to
create by giving them a limited monopoly on the rights to their
works. In return for this limited monopoly, the public receives a
benefit from the authors’ creations when the works enter the public
domain after the copyright expires.228 Thus, the monopoly created
by copyright “rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public.”229
The reproduction right, in connection with the distribution
right, and the derivative right provide distinct incentives to create.
The exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted
work gives the author the incentive to exploit his work through
dissemination.230 On the other hand, the derivative right gives
authors the incentive to add something to the original work231 that
gives it “new expression, meaning, or message”232 so that it can
qualify for copyright protection on its own and provide further
profit to the author from his original work.233 In giving the
original work “new expression, meaning or message,”234 a
derivative work exists at the “point at which the contribution of
228

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.

Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
229
Id. at 546. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
477 (1984)).
230
Patterson, supra note 211, at 7. “If copyright encourages creation, it does so only for
the purpose of profit. Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribution.” Id.
231
Id.
232
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
233
Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (1983) [hereinafter Goldstein Derivative Rights Article].
234
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579.
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independent expression to an existing work effectively creates a
new work for a different market.”235 Professor Paul Goldstein
summarized the difference in the economic incentives that arise
from the two exclusive rights:
Indifference to copyright economics has . . . occasionally
produced improper curbs on derivative rights, most notably
in cases perceived to involve utilitarian uses and fair uses
of underlying works. The mistake in both contexts stems
from a failure to distinguish between derivative rights and
reproduction rights, and to recognize that the investment
effects of section 106(2)’s exclusive right to prepare
derivative works differ markedly from the investment
effects of section 106(1)’s exclusive right to reproduce
copies.
Derivative rights affect the level of investment in
copyrighted works by enabling the copyright owner to
proportion its investment to the level of expected returns
from all markets, not just the market in which the work first
appears, as is generally the case with reproduction
rights. . . .
Derivative rights . . . affect the direction of investment in
copyrighted works. . . . The [author] may . . . seek returns
in other derivative markets, or only in the original
market. . . . [B]y securing exclusive rights to all derivative
markets, the statute enables the copyright proprietor to
select those toward which it will direct investment.236
Consideration of the incentive structure of the Copyright Act
becomes particularly important in properly applying the fair-use
doctrine to allegedly infringing derivative works. Historically, the
fair-use doctrine was used in cases involving exact copies of
copyrighted works which directly competed with the original.237
As the scope of rights granted to the copyright owner has
expanded, the last factor of the fair-use doctrine, “the effect of the
235
236
237

Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233.
Id.
Id.
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use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work,”238 has become the most important239 and problematic
factor,240 particularly with regards to derivative rights.241
The importance of this factor is demonstrated by the holdings
of courts which find that it does not matter if the copyright owner
has exploited the derivative markets. Instead, what is important is
whether his ability to exploit those markets is harmed.242 Professor
Goldstein asserts that:
courts have given the term ‘potential’ a far narrower
construction than is appropriate in light of the Copyright
Act’s expansive grant of derivative rights. . . . [T]he Act
gives the author of a novel exclusive rights not only to the
market for hardcover sales, but also to paperback sales,
magazine serialization or condensation, and motion picture
and television productions. . . . Any one of these markets,
and certainly all together, can yield far greater returns to
the copyright owner than the sales in the hardcover market
alone. Yet, courts applying the potential market factor
have generally inclined to identify potential markets with
the market in which the work was first introduced or, at
most, with closely bordering markets.243
The identification of ‘potential’ markets that the copyrighted
work may enter is crucial in cases involving derivative rights,
which, by definition, secure markets at some remove from the
market first entered.244 Concern for the incentive structure of the
Copyright Act lends weight to the serious consideration of
Congress’s statements that unfixed works may infringe the
derivative right.

238

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
240
PATRY, supra note 57, at 250.
241
Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233.
242
See Micro Star v. FormGen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1984); Pacific &
Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1987).
243
Goldstein Derivative Rights Article, supra note 233.
244
Id.
239
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III. APPLICATION OF LAWS AND POLICY TO THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER FIXATION IS REQUIRED
TO INFRINGE THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT
Today, digital technology allows works to be altered without
ever creating a fixed version of the altered form. Digital
technology allows these unfixed, altered works to be recreated in
an identical fashion infinitely. Thus far, the courts have required
that works be fixed to infringe the derivative right. However, the
capabilities of digital technology challenge this requirement.
A. Moral Rights Will Not Provide Relief to the Movie Studios
First, it is worth noting that if moral rights were recognized for
audio-visual works under United States law, the modifications
made to the original work using the sanitizing technology would
likely not infringe upon the movie studios’ moral rights. It would
be difficult to argue under the prevailing legal standards that the
modifications constitute deforming or mutilating changes to the
movies.245 Alterations that can “prejudice an artist’s honor or
reputation are generally limited to those changes which are
considered “deforming” or “mutilating.”246 United States courts
typically require drastic revisions to be made to works before they
grant remedies for violation of the integrity right.247 In Saving
245

Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995)).
246
Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50–51 (D.P.R. 2004); Flack v.
Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
247
See Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (finding that the right of integrity under VARA
was violated by the grossly negligent restoration of a sculpture which resulted in a
“distorted, mutilated” work); Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976) (enjoining ABC from broadcasting a version of the Monty Python show in which
twenty-four of the ninety minutes had been cut); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,
49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 830,
269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t 1966), aff’d, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966)
(denying injunctive relief where minor cuts were made to the motion picture in television
broadcast of movie in order to insert commercials); Autry v. Republic Prods., 213 F.2d
667 (9th Cir. 1954) (enjoining the producer from cutting movies in which Autry appeared
to fifty-three minutes so that they could be shown in a one hour slot on television with
commercial breaks); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225–26 (asserting that the alterations made by the editing technology
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Private Ryan although the edits likely eliminate what makes the
movie remarkable, the plot and characters remain intact. It is
likely a court would find that the revisions are not sufficiently
drastic to constitute a violation of the studios’ moral rights. In fact,
the editing companies create software for only those movies where
the essence of the movie is not destroyed by the material skipped
or muted.248 Although moral rights may not be of use to the
particular alterations made by the movie-editing technology,
alterations made to copyrighted works in the future may be
substantial enough to warrant protection of the copyrighted work
under the right of integrity.
B. The Unfixed, Altered Works Do Not Constitute a Violation of
the Reproduction Right
Second, it is also worth noting that, in the case of the altered
works created by editing software, if the altered works were fixed,
the works would likely constitute a violation of the reproduction
right.249 The reproduction right is violated when the work is
reproduced in whole or in substantial part.250 The altered works
are reproductions of the films in substantial part.251 In addition,
because the software intends to produce the original as completely
as possible and does not intend to create a new, transformative
work, liability for violation of the reproduction right cannot be
escaped by an argument that the altered version merely uses the
ideas of the original work and infuses those ideas with “new
expression, meaning, or message.”252 Ultimately, though, the
reproduction right unequivocally requires that the allegedly
infringing work be fixed in a tangible medium.253 Thus, relief
would be denied to the movie studios for violation of the
did not impact the moral rights of the studios any more than standard alterations made to
movies).
248
Vosepka, supra note 22.
249
H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 7, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225 (2005).
“The Committee is aware of services and companies that create fixed derivative copies of
motion pictures and believes that such practices are illegal under the Copyright Act.” Id.
250
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
251
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14.
252
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
253
See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61–62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
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reproduction right by the versions altered by use of the editing
software.
C. Unfixed, Altered Works May Infringe the Movie Studios’
Derivative Rights
1. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Does Not Assist in
Avoiding Liability for Infringement
An application of the idea-expression dichotomy254 to the
altered versions of the movies would not excuse the software
companies from liability. In producing unfixed, altered versions of
existing works, the software reworks only the expression of the
original author, not the ideas of the author. Nothing new is added
to the public collection of ideas and expression by these altered
works. Although the altered versions of the movies do reach a new
group of consumers, the movies are new to this market, not
because the consumers previously did not have access to the films,
but because they deliberately chose255 not to expose themselves to
the movies due to their mature content.

254

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000).
This is in distinction from Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984). Sony involved a claim of contributory and vicarious infringement of the
reproduction rights of several movie studios by Sony, a maker of videocassette recorders
(VCRs), through Sony’s consumers that recorded the studios’ copyrighted films when
they were broadcast on network television. The Sony Court found influential that the
VCRs increased access to the television network programming through “‘timeshifting’—the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and
thereafter erasing it,” id. at 423, and thus served the recognized societal interest. Id. at
454. The Sony Court relied on Community Television of S. California v. Gottfried, 459
U.S. 498, 508 n.12 (1983), for its recognition of the societal interest in increasing access
to network television programming. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. In the case of the editing
software, although the sanitizing practice targets a distinct market, it does not actually
increase access to the movie, because the market targeted is a market that chose not to
view the movies unaltered rather than a market that was unable to view the movies
unaltered.
255
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2. Ultimately, the Fair Use Defense Does Not Protect Against
Liability for Infringement
Instead, the unfixed, altered versions of the original movies
must be analyzed as an infringement of the derivative right256 of
the original works. According to the language of the Act, the right
to prepare derivative works includes the right to adapt a work.257
The altered versions of the films likely constitute an adaptation of
the film because the films are adapted for a unique audience—
those who are religiously sensitive and those who are children.
Assuming for the moment that an unfixed, altered work can
constitute a violation of the derivative right, the altered versions
must be analyzed under the fair-use doctrine.258
The first factor of the analysis, the purpose and character of the
use,259 considers three aspects of the allegedly infringing work: (i)
whether the work is being used for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (ii)
how transformative the new work is; and (iii) whether the use of
the work is commercial.260 First, the primary use of the original
works by the editing companies is not for purposes of criticism,
commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, selfexpression or the reduction of violence.261 The primary use of the
original works is to profit from exploitation of a distinct market.262
Therefore, the copyrighted work is not being used for purposes
which are at the core of First Amendment protection.
Second, the altered versions of the movies are not
transformative. The altered versions do not have a “new
expression, meaning, or message.”263 Although a specific standard
of morality is inserted into the movies, the software does not create
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
Id. § 101.
Id. § 107.
Id. § 107(1).
See id. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see supra note 209.
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291.
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.
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a different and truly “moral” version of the story that might qualify
as transformative. Instead, the software merely creates a nonoffensive version of the original for the consumer.264 The purpose
of using the editing software is not to create a new work, but is to
experience the original as wholly as possible without viewing the
offensive content.265 Moreover, the use of almost the entire film in
the altered version reveals a “dearth of transformative character or
purpose.”266 Therefore, the purposes of copyright law are not
served by the altered versions of the movies because the altered
work adds little to the stash of creative works in society.267
Third, although the purpose of the use of the original films by
the software companies is commercial—to serve a niche in the athome movie-viewing market268—the purpose of the use of the
altered films by consumers is at-home use, a noncommercial use.
In a contributory infringement action, the type of action that would
likely be brought against the software companies, the
noncommercial nature of the use by the consumer would be the
focus of the court’s inquiry. In total, it is unclear which way the
first factor would swing. The central purpose of the fair-use
defense is to determine whether the new work merely
“supersede[s] the object[]”269 of the original creation. If the altered
version were considered to replace the original, the first factor may
weigh somewhat in favor of the movie studios. However, if the
altered version were instead viewed as either targeting a distinct
market or increasing the profits of the original, the first factor
would tend to weigh in favor of the technology companies.
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,270
considers how close to the core of intended copyright protection
the original work falls. When a work is at the core of the purpose
264

Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291.
See id. at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14.
266
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587.
267
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
“[C]opyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.” Id.
268
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291.
269
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
270
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
265
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of the Act, it is harder to justify the fair use of that work.271 The
copyrighted works which are altered fall within the core of the
works intended to be protected by copyright law. Thus, the second
factor weighs heavily against the software companies.
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,272 also weighs
heavily against the software companies, because the original works
are used nearly in their entirety.273 The edited portions are,
arguably, mere fringe in comparison to the essential elements of
the movie, i.e., the storyline and the characters. Therefore, not
only do the altered versions use almost the entire copyrighted
work, but they use the parts that are of the most value to the work.
Analysis of the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market
or value of the work,274 requires the most sensitive analysis of the
four factors. Where “a substantial portion of the infringing work
[is] copied verbatim” from the copyrighted work, there may be a
greater likelihood of market harm because the altered work may
tend to supersede the need for the original work.275 However,
because the consumer must buy or rent the original DVD to use the
editing software,276 the effect on the original market may actually
be to increase sales of the original movies, since consumers
reluctant to view it with objectionable content might now rent or
buy the DVD to view an edited version.
Nevertheless, a second aspect of the analysis under the fourth
factor is the consideration of the effect on the derivative markets
for the original work.277 The market at which the altered versions
are targeted is distinct: it consists of religiously-sensitive
viewers278 and parents of children who wish to view movies with
271

Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
273
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 300; Nokes, supra note 16, at 611–14.
274
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
275
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587–88.
276
Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–90; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294; Nokes, supra note
16, at 619–21.
277
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
278
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 291–92.
272
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their children with the mature material edited.279 These viewers
desire to watch movies containing mature material primarily, if not
exclusively, in an altered form, as indicated by the popularity of
the e-rated industry.280 Although movie studios work with airlines
and television networks to develop sanitized versions for use by
airlines and television networks, only one studio has thus far
entered the market for sanitized movies for home viewing.281
The individuals of the targeted market either become new
purchasers of copies of the original movie, or put their alreadypurchased copies of the original movie to new use. The new
purchasers potentially increase the market for the original DVD.
Those who put existing copies to new use might include parents
who have viewed a movie without their children, who then, after
purchasing the technology and downloading the software for the
movie, view the sanitized version of the movie with their children.
Movie studios rely enormously on the home-viewing market to
stay financially afloat.282 In 2004, the six major movie studios,
Disney, Fox, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Universal and Sony,
had total revenues of $7.4 billion from world-wide box-office
sales, $20.9 billion from world-wide video and DVD sales, and
279

Glasser, supra note 17, at 134–35; Kerns, supra note 17, at 513.
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292. “CleanFlicks experienced fast growth to
approximately seventy stores in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.” Id.
281
See Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes, supra note
16, at 615–16. Studios have collaborated with airlines and television networks to
produce versions of films that are appropriate for audiences that might include children.
Warner Brothers’ studio, New Line Cinema, has agreed to endorse the Dove Foundation
of Michigan’s edited versions of the studio’s films to be marketed in Target and WalMart stores. The Dove Foundation is “a media watchdog group with ties to Christian
publishing.” Nokes, supra note 16, at 616; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that
studios have worked with television networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies);
Dan Luzadder, CleanFlicks Offers Videos Free of Sex, Swearing, DENVER POST, Dec. 28,
2001, at A1 (stating that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that
Warner Brothers will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner
Brothers).
282
OLIGOPOLY WATCH: THE LATEST MANEUVERS OF THE NEW OLIGOPOLIES AND WHAT
THEY
MEAN,
INDUSTRY
BRIEF:
MOVIES
I,
Aug.
6,
2003,
http://www.oligopolywatch.com/2003/08/06.html (last visited September 21, 2005)
[hereinafter OLIGOPOLY WATCH]; David D. Kirkpatrick, Action-Hungry DVD Fans Sway
Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, at 1.
280
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$17.7 billion from world-wide television licensing.283
In
comparison with the time before television and video-cassette
recorders when studios relied heavily on box-office sales,284 today,
the aftermarkets are critical to the financial health of the movie
studios, rather than merely incidental to their earnings.285 The
earnings from DVD sales and television licensing have caused
movie studios to rethink their strategy in promoting and releasing
their films.286 As a result, the lag between cinematic releases and
releases on home video and DVD and licenses to television
networks has shortened from six months to as little as two
months.287 The shortened window allows studios to capture a
bigger share of the DVD market and to reduce the amount they
spend on marketing, one of their biggest expenses.288 Therefore,
accelerated DVD launches create greater profits and reduce
expenses.
Moreover, between 1989 and 2003, according to the Dove
Foundation, the average G-rated film produced $79 million in
profits, which is 11 times greater than the profits earned by the
average R-rated film, which earned $7 million per film.289 During
the same time span, G-rated films produced three times the rate of
return on investment than R-rated films generated.290 G-rated
films also produced higher net profit per film and video revenue
per film than R-rated films.291 A comparison of the profits from
PG-rated films and PG-13-rated films during the same period

283

Edward Jay Epstein, Hollywood’s Profits, Demystified: The Real El Dorado is TV,
SLATE, Aug. 8, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2124078/?nav=ais.
284
Id.
285
Kirkpatrick, supra note 282; Sharon Waxman, Swelling Demand for Disks Alters
Hollywood’s Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at E1; OLIGOPOLY WATCH, supra
note 282.
286
Joshua Chaffin, Hollywood Is Facing a Journey Into the Unknown, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2005, at 17; OLIGOPOLY WATCH, supra note 282.
287
Chaffin, supra note 286.
288
Id.
289
For Movies, G is for Gold: Study Says Movies Rated Suitable for General Audiences
Are Far More Profitable Than More Adult Fare, CNNMONEY, June 7, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/07/news/newsmakers/dove_ movies/.
290
Id.
291
Id.
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reveals similar trends.292 PG-rated films produced an average of
$78.8 million in profit and PG-13-rated films earned an average of
$45.6 million in profits.293
These numbers indicate that the market for sanitized films for
home-viewing could provide enormous profits to the studios. The
concern of the studios that their derivative rights may be infringed
is not petty. Thus, the conflict between (a) giving strong
protection to works in order to encourage creation of original
works and (b) interpreting derivative rights more narrowly in order
to encourage the advancement of technology now becomes
striking.
The courts have looked carefully at the markets exploited by
alleged infringers of the derivative right. In its analysis of the last
factor of the fair-use defense, the effect on the potential market or
value of the work, Galoob294 focused its concerns on the
advancement of technology. Galoob required that the copyright
owner, Nintendo, “show a reasonable likelihood of a potential
market for slightly altered versions of the games at suit.”295
Although the Galoob court recognized precedent which required
consideration of the effect on the derivative market,296 it found
support in the facts that Nintendo had not produced or even
considered producing altered versions of its existing games,297 and
that Nintendo had failed to show the reasonable likelihood of
entering a new market with slightly-altered versions of existing
games.298 The Galoob court found support for this finding in the
testimony of Galoob’s expert witness, Stephen Beck, who testified
that:
junior or expert versions of existing Nintendo games would
enjoy very little market interest because the original version
of each game already has been designed to appeal to the
292

Id.
Id.
294
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
295
Id. at 971 (quoting the district court, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
296
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id.
293
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largest number of consumers. . . . [A] new game must
include new material or “the game player is going to feel
very cheated and robbed, and [the] product will have a bad
reputation and word of mouth will probably kill its
sales.”299
The Galoob court also found support for its finding in the
testimony of Howard Lincoln, Senior Vice President of Nintendo
of America, who acknowledged that “Nintendo has no present
plans to market such games.”300 Thus, the court’s focus on the
reasonability of the copyright owner’s entrance into a market they
had not yet entered enabled the court to deny relief to the copyright
owner and to allow technology to progress.301
In contrast to Galoob,302 the court in Midway303 focused its
concern on the protection of the derivative market so that creation
of original works would be encouraged. The Midway court held
that the speeded-up video game at issue constituted a derivative
work, and that the copyright owner should be allowed to
monopolize the speeded-up version for the same reasons that the
copyright owner is allowed to monopolize derivative works under
the derivative right.304 The Midway court reasoned that “the
amount by which the language of Section 101 must be stretched to
accommodate speed-up video games is . . . within the limits within
which Congress wanted the new Act to operate.”305 The FormGen
court articulated a similar view in its finding that “by selling [Nuke
It], Micro Star ‘impinged on [FormGen’s] ability to market new
versions of the [Duke Nukem 3D] story.’ Only FormGen has a

299

Id. at 971–72.
Id. at 972.
301
Id. at 969. “In holding that the audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie are
not derivative works, we recognize that technology often advances by improvement
rather than replacement.” Id. The court found that The Game Genie only enhances a
Nintendo game’s output, thus, the court concluded that “[s]uch innovations rarely will
constitute infringing derivative works under the Copyright Act.” Id. (emphasis added).
302
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
303
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
304
Id. at 1014.
305
Id.
300
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right to enter that market; whether it chooses to do so is entirely its
business.”306
In the case of the movie-editing software, the timings that
instruct the DVD player to skip or mute objectionable material are
contained in the software.307 However, like the devices at issue in
Galoob and FormGen, these timings are useless without a copy of
the original movie.308 The editing software does not contain any
copyrighted material, but instead instructs the DVD player which
materials to use. The distinction between Galoob and FormGen
that seems to have led to their opposite conclusions regarding the
liability of the defendants in those actions is that the Nuke It CD at
issue in FormGen created truly new levels in the game309 instead
of merely altering the existing aspects of the game, as the Game
Genie did in Galoob.310 The software here, compares more closely
with Galoob’s Game Genie. The software does not create a new,
distinct “sequel” to the movie, but rather eliminates existing
aspects of the movie.
However, in contrast with the factual situation before the
Galoob court, whose decision was influenced by the fact that
Nintendo could not reasonably market the slightly-altered
games,311 here, the movie studios could reasonably market the
slightly-altered movies. The consumers purchasing either the
physically-edited copies of movies or the editing software are
distinct from the average viewer of the movies selected for editing.
These consumers do not feel “cheated and robbed” by the slightlyaltered versions of the movies nor do they “bad mouth” the
product, as Galoob’s expert witness, Mr. Beck, testified the
Nintendo consumers would do if Nintendo were to produce a
slightly-altered version of its game.312 Instead, the e-rated industry

306

Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998).
Kerns, supra note 17, at 489–92.
308
Id. at 489–90; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 294; Nokes, supra note 16, at 619–21.
309
See FormGen, 154 F.3d at 1112–13.
310
Id. at 1111; Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967
(9th Cir. 1992).
311
Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971–72.
312
Id.
307

HAZEL

348

2/3/2006 10:59 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 16:297

offers slightly-altered versions of the original movies to a distinct
market and has experienced rapid growth within that market.313
Moreover, although only one movie studio has targeted
individual consumers on a small scale, multiple movie studios have
worked with airline and television networks to develop sanitized
versions of the movies.314 The importance of the collaboration
between the movie studios and the airlines and television networks
is that the difficult, artistic decisions have been made, which are
necessary to edit films with mature content so that they are suitable
for children. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for the
movie studios to enter the market of sanitized movies for the
individual consumer. Studios could offer physically-altered
versions. Or, if they preferred to take advantage of the digital
editing technology, the translation of the timings of the edits made
to create the physically-altered copies to the editing software
should be a mundane task. Applying the reasoning of the
Galoob,315 FormGen,316 and Midway317 courts to the editing
software leads to the conclusion that the editing companies have
impinged upon the studios’ copyrights. It would be reasonable for
the studios to enter the market exploited by the editing
companies.318 A copyright owner has a right to monopolize
derivative works which incorporate his original, copyrighted work
and enter the markets the derivative works exploit.319

313
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292. “CleanFlicks experienced fast growth to
approximately seventy stores in eighteen states in the Midwest and West including
California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Oregon.” Id.
314
Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes, supra note 16,
at 615–16; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that studios have worked with television
networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies); Luzadder, supra note 281 (stating
that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that Warner Brothers
will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner Brothers); see also
supra note 281.
315
964 F.2d 965.
316
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
317
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1982).
318
Cf. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 971–72.
319
FormGen, 154 F.3d at 1113; Midway, 704 F.2d at 1014.
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D. The Statutory Language and Legislative History of the
Copyright Act Strongly Suggest That Fixation Is Not Required
to Infringe the Derivative Right
The implication of the statutory language and the legislative
history on the unfixed, altered works must also be considered. The
analysis of the statutory use of the word “prepare” in granting the
derivative right,320 rather than “create,” whose definition includes a
requirement of fixation,321 is not entirely conclusive. Even if the
conclusion that the statutory use of the word “prepare” in the grant
of derivative rights were dismissed as distinguishing between the
type of labor the author performs rather than distinguishing among
fixed or unfixed works, or as saying nothing about the
requirements for infringement of the derivative right at all, the
legislative history of the derivative right indicates in plain
language that to infringe the derivative right, the infringing work
need not be fixed.322
This concept is supported by the observation in the Nimmer
treatise that infringement of the derivative right necessarily also
infringes either the reproduction right or the performance right.323
In making a contradictory conclusion that the language in the Act
is not ambiguous, the Nimmer treatise describes the statements in
the legislative history regarding the dual standard for
copyrightability and infringement of derivative works as “fleeting
remarks,” and asserts that they, therefore, should be ignored.324
However, because fixation is one of the two elements of
copyrightability and is required for infringement of at least some of
the exclusive rights granted, it is unlikely that Congress treated the
topic lightly in its discussion of the infringement of the derivative
right. Congress goes into much detail to describe what constitutes
fixation325 and what constitutes infringement of the derivative

320
321
322
323
324
325

17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
Id. § 101.
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
2 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 54, at § 8.09[A].
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 52–53 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 51–52 (1975).
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right.326 It seems implausible that a statement concerning the lack
of a requirement of fixation for works that may infringe the
derivative right of the copyright owner would be a “fleeting
remark.” Moreover, the fact that Congress presently feels the need
to exempt the editing software from liability under the Family
Movie Act327 suggests that Congress stills maintains that the
infringement of the derivative right does not require fixation.
E. Concern for the Incentive Structure of the Copyright Act
Supports the Protection of the Derivative Right
The incentive structure of Copyright Act must also be
considered in relation to the unfixed, altered works created by the
editing software. The incentive structure behind the Act’s grant of
derivative rights has two, often interrelated, aspects. First, the
protection of the derivative right encourages the author to add
something to the original work to give it “new expression,
meaning, or message”328 which furthers the purpose of the
Copyright Act.329 Second, as a result of the development of the
last factor of the fair-use analysis, the effect of the use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work,330
protection of the author’s exclusive right to enter potential markets,
which are distinct from the market in which the copyrighted work
originally exploited, serves to protect the author’s derivative
right.331 In an application of these concepts to the altered versions
of the movies created by the software, it is clear that the altered
versions do not contain “new expression, meaning, or message,”332
but that they do target a distinct market.333 Because the movie
studios already sanitize movies for airlines and television
326

H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 61–62 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 58 (1975).
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–9, §§ 201–202, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
328
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
329
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985);
Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1984); Birnhack,
supra note 211, at 269.
330
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
331
Id.
332
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. at 579.
333
Mitakis, supra note 16, at 292.
327
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networks, the market is one that the movie studios could
reasonably enter, although it thus far has remained relatively
untapped.334
In sum, the current copyright law is the result of much
reflection on the purpose of the Copyright Act. The development
of derivative rights is one specific aspect of this reflection. The
concepts articulated in the case law and scholarly articles on
derivative rights, as well as the statutory language of and
legislative history behind the derivative right, indicate that
infringement of the derivative right need not require fixation.
However, proper restraints should be placed on this
pronouncement so as not to impede the advancement of
technology.
CONCLUSION
The determination of whether alterations enabled by
technology violate the copyright owner’s monopoly should be
made under the existing internal restraints on copyright, the ideaexpression dichotomy and the fair-use doctrine. In the case of the
altered versions of the movies produced by the editing software,
Congress has already weighed the interests affected and spoken on
the subject in its Family Movie Act, indicating that, in this case,
the interests of the consumer weigh more heavily than the interests
of the copyright owners in the emerging market.
In defining the scope of the protection afforded to copyright
owners from unfixed works which potentially infringe their
derivative rights, I propose that two considerations be considered
in the matrix of competing interests. First, if the technology is able
to reproduce the altered version in an identical fashion infinitely,
this is equivalent to fixation. Thus, unfixed, altered works which
334
Glasser, supra note 17, at 176; Mitakis, supra note 16, at 293; Nokes supra note 16,
at 615–16; see Aguilar, supra note 18 (reporting that studios have worked with television
networks and airlines to produce sanitized movies); Luzadder, supra note 281 (stating
that the Dove Foundation of Michigan announced an agreement that Warner Brothers
will endorse Dove’s sanitized versions of movies made by Warner Brothers); see also
supra note 281.
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cannot be reproduced in the same manner repeatedly would be
protected from liability.
Second, the Galoob court developed a concept of market
exploitation which might prove useful in efforts to protect the
copyright owner’s derivative rights without impeding the
progression of technology. Under the fair-use analysis, courts
should not only consider whether the defendant is exploiting a
potential market for the copyrighted work, but they should also
consider whether it would be reasonable for the copyright owner
to enter the market exploited by the alleged infringer.335 If so,
liability should be imposed. If not, the market development should
not be considered an infringement.
Putting aside the exemptions under the Family Movie Act, the
application of the first factor to the editing software, whether the
unfixed, altered versions can be reproduced in an identical fashion
infinitely, tends towards a finding of liability. The altered versions
clearly can be reproduced in an identical fashion infinitely. A
consumer merely has to leave the settings at the same levels and
the identical material will be skipped or muted. Thus, this factor
favors the movie studios.
Under the second factor, whether it would be reasonable for the
copyright owners to enter the market exploited by the alleged
infringer, the editing companies target a market which, unlike the
market in Galoob,336 is a reasonable market for the studios to
target. Moreover, the movie studios have worked with airlines and
television networks to develop sanitized versions of their films,
and thus have already made the artistic decisions necessary to edit
individual films with offensive material so that they are
appropriate for children. Under Midway337 and FormGen,338 the
studios should be able to choose whether to enter this market and
how to enter this market. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of
the movie studios.
335

Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc, 964 F.2d 965, 971–72 (9th Cir.
1992).
336
Id.
337
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983).
338
Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998).
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In total, the balance of the competing interests under copyright
law of the copyright owners and the public tend toward a finding
of infringement. In this particular situation, Congress has
exempted the editing software from any finding of infringement
under the Family Movie Act. This Act was passed to protect the
technology developed and the consumers’ interest in having the
ability to skip or mute objectionable material.339 If the analysis
presented in this note were to be accepted by courts, without the
exemption under the Family Movie Act, the software companies
would face a credible challenge by the movie studios in a dispute
over the scope of the studios’ rights under the Copyright Act.

339

H.R. REP. NO. 109–33(I), at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 224.

